Realists vs Globalists

Petr Akopov

Henry Kissinger, who is celebrating his 99th birthday tomorrow, and 91-year-old George Soros, have long been turned into a modern version of the Old Testament prophets, but the Western world does not expect them to denounce their own ulcers, but a recipe for fighting diseases that torment the global project unfinished by the Anglo-Saxons. And if not a prescription, then at least an accurate diagnosis of the disease. And since the West is now “sick” of Russia, you need to understand what to do with this disease and how to stop it.
At the forum in Davos, both “old men” spoke about Russia, outlining the two main approaches of the Atlantic elite. The approa-ches are fundamentally different, although they have one common feature, but about it at the very end.
Soros’s position is absolutely clear: “The invasion may have been the beginning of the third world war, and our civilization may not survive it. The best and perhaps the only way to save our civilization is to defeat Putin as soon as possible.”
That is, Putin’s Russia is a threat to Western civilization like Hitler’s Germany, and it must be defeated. And at any cost: when Soros says that “we must mobilize all our resources in order to end the war as soon as possible,” he means precisely the defeat of Russia, and not peace negotiations:
“But a ceasefire is unattainable, because he (Putin. – Approx. Author) cannot be trusted.”
Soros simply repeats the words of the radical part of the Anglo-Saxon elites (and Warsaw echoes, calling for an end to the Russian world), and so far they have managed to impose this approach on most of the European elites. Which, with all this, are well aware that they were made hostages of the Anglo-Saxon game against Russia, and they are absolutely not going to bet everything on its defeat. It is their position, as well as the views of realists among the Anglo-Saxons, that Henry Kissinger expresses.
“Russia has been an essential part of Europe for 400 years now, and European politics during this period was mainly influenced by its assessment of the role of Russia. Sometimes as an observer, but in some cases as a guarantor or instrument with which to restore the European balance. Current policy should bear in mind that it is important to restore this role so that Russia is not forced into a permanent alliance with China.”
Therefore, Kissinger says that we need to return to his proposal of 2014, formulated after the Crimea and Donbass : “The ideal way out would be the creation of Ukraine as a neutral state, as a bridge between Russia and Europe, as a dividing line.” He stated that this possibility “does not currently exist in the same sense, but it can still be seen as an end goal”: “Movement towards peace talks must be started within the next two months so that the end of the war can be summed up. Do this before it can cause upheavals and tensions that will be increasingly difficult to overcome, especially between the possible relations of Russia, Georgia and Ukraine with Europe. Ideally, the dividing line should return to the former status quo.
I believe that the entry (of the West. – Author’s no-te) into a war outside of Po-land will lead to the fact th-at it will turn into a war not for the freedom of Ukraine, which was undertaken with great unity by NATO, but against Russia itself.
The important thing here is not that Kissinger does not stake on the defeat of Russia, calling for negotiations, but what guides him in doing so. If for Soros the future of globalization is fundamental, which he de-scribes as a struggle betw-een two systems diametrically opposed to each other, an open society (the West) and a closed one (Russia and China ), then for Kissinger it is significant to preserve the key role of the West in the world order. The goal is more modest, but also more realistic. Therefore, if Soros appeals to a “bright future” (and the sacrifices in the fight against Russia in its name), Kissinger refers to the past, recalling its 400-year-old role in European politics and the European balance of power. And he says that it is impossible to push Moscow towards Beijing – this is unprofitable for the West itself.
That is, if for Soros Putin and Xi are unequivocal enemies and already allies: “Today China and Russia pose the greatest threat to an open society,” then for Kissinger everything is still not a foregone conclusion. For him, these countries are like counterbalances, and he does not want to believe that relations between Moscow and Beijing have long been independent of the strategy of the West. Quite understandable stubbornness for a strategist who, half a century ago, played a combination beneficial for the Americans in the Moscow-Washington-Beijing triangle (the real initiator, which, however, was China, but they don’t like to remember this).
With all this, Kissinger’s position is much more realistic than Soros’s, because the West definitely does not have the strength to defeat Russia (not because it is weaker, but because we have different stakes). Yes, it is impossible to tear it away from China (this is a conscious strategic choice of Moscow and Beijing, caused precisely by the need to oppose the Western project), but it is quite realistic to prevent a complete rupture between Europe and Russia. And, what is important for Atlantic realists, this is in the interests of the West itself: in the new, post-Western world, it will no longer be the hegemon, but only the most powerful of the players. Moreover, such that for some time it will be able to ensure the functioning of the world system according to the old Anglo-Saxon rules.
This is Kissinger’s simple plan, and besides, he is counting on the fact that China and the US can still keep from sliding into open confrontation. The problem with this plan (without assessing its realism): for the Atlantic radicals, those who are sure that they have enough strength both to contain Russia and China and to fight for the victorious march of globalization, Kissinger’s position is absolutely unacceptable and defeatist. Not only in Kiev they react to the statements of the former secretary of state as to the arguments of a “Davos alarmist”, a considerable part of the supranational Atlantic elites also believe in the same way.
And this becomes another evidence of the deepest ideological crisis in which they are, and the unwillingness to recognize reality is only a consequence of this. Hence the unrealistic goals, and actions that worsen their own situation. Betting on Moscow’s defeat is the worst mistake of the West.
At the same time, Kissinger’s plan cannot be called successful for the Anglo-Saxons, because, like Soros, he underestimates Russia (albeit to a lesser extent) and does not understand our goals.
Neutral Ukraine can no longer be the subject of a compromise between the West and Russia, this should have been discussed not before February 24, 2022, but before February 2014, before the overthrow of Yanukovych and the victory of Euromaidan. To Kissinger’s credit, he suggested this even ten or fifteen years ago, but at that time in the West many people already considered Ukraine potentially theirs.
Now there can be no talk of any neutrality, simply because Russia is returning its historical unity and the Ukrainian (that is, Little Russian and Novorossiysk) problem is becoming an internal affair of our people.
The West can try with all its might to interfere with us, to delay this process, but sooner or later it will have to come to terms with reality and admit the inevitable: another attempt to revise the borders of Europe and the Russian world has failed – just like all the previous ones.

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