Relations between Russia and China exceed the allied level, Xi Jinping said at yesterday’s talks with Vladimir Putin. Although the meeting was held in the format of a video conference, it is considered a full-fledged one – which is why the Chinese leader stressed that this is the 37th personal meeting of the two leaders since 2013 (that is, since Xi took over the leadership of China).
If it were not for the coronavirus, the score would have been in its fifties long ago, because the last time Xi and Putin shook hands in November 2019, and before that they had met several times a y-ear. However, very soon the two leaders will see each other in person: in early February, Putin will fly to Beijing. Both the negotiations and the opening ceremony of the Olympics, which the United States and other Anglo-Saxon countries are boycotting at the diplomatic level. But it was the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics that became the only foreign Games that the President of the United States attended. And not only George W. Bush- junior, but most of the American elite still believed that China would agree to a secondary role in globalization, and Russia would be an unpleasant, but regional power and, most importantly, relations in the Moscow-Washington-Beijing triangle would be formed primarily under American influence. But 13 years later, we see a completely different picture of the world than the one that was in the heads of American strategists.
No, Russia and China did not enter into an official military-political alliance, but their relations really be-gan to surpass allied ones, if we understand by them those that exist within the Western bloc. Because the latter are based on (to varying degrees) dependence of the junior partners on the older, Anglo-Saxon, and equality and common interest play an important role in relations between Russia and China. Moreover, the interest is both national (strengthening one’s own country and its positions in the world) and global – building a new world order, a new system that is being created on the ruins of the Atlantic project.
Precisely so that the ruins do not become literal, that is, the collapse of the failed (but unwilling to admit it) Anglo-Saxon hegemony did not entail global chaos, did not harm China and Russia, and a strong Russian-Chinese bond is needed. So the strategic choice of Moscow and Beijing in favor of further rapprochement is not only clear: it is inevitable. No external forces can influence relations between the two countries, and although this has long been understood, now it was not superfluous to emphasize again. And not only statements about the need to create an independent financial infrastructure to service trade operations between Russia and China, which could not be influenced by third countries, although this in itself is an important milestone.
That is why Xi Jinping began the conversation w-ith a high assessment of the actions of Putin, who is st-rongly opposed to attempts to sow discord between our countries. Indeed, Putin recently recalled that “some Western partners are openly trying to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing,” stressing that China and Russia will respond to such attempts by expanding partnerships and coordinating steps in the international arena. That is, the more you try to embroil us, the more harmoniously we will act. By the way, this remark of Putin sounded a couple of days after the Xi and Biden video summit, and a week ago Biden had a video meeting with Putin. The Americans’ game is no secret to anyone: Washing-ton still hopes to turn back the clock, fan the flames of Russian-Chinese contradictions in order to weaken the alliance between Moscow and Beijing.
Russia and China, as two great neighboring powers, naturally have both competition and controversial issues in certain spheres and regions, but Putin and Xi understand perfectly well that Americans should not even be given a chance to play on differences, they should not be allowed to try to turn the cracks into the faults. After all, what unites Russia and China is incomparably larger and more important for both countries than all that can really and potentially divide the-m. The stakes are higher th-an ever, and Moscow and Beijing have no right to repeat the mistake of the 1960s. Then we ourselves destroyed our allied relations, and already in the 70s the Americans began to play on this. If it had not been for the quarrel of the early 60s, not only could the fate of the PRC (for example, there would have been no “cultural revolution”) and the USSR – the whole world history could have gone a different path.
Yes, history does not tolerate the subjunctive mood, but it provides an opportunity to learn from your mistakes. Russia and China have learned well the lessons of the recent history of our relations and can now watch the bustle of the Atlantic players. Those who are perplexed – how could it be? Ten years ago everything seemed so clear and, in principle, solvable: Russia is no longer a global player (even Putin was advised not to return to the Kremlin), China will sooner or later agree to the role of a junior partner in the Big Two, and the Russian-Chi-nese alliance cannot be stable, because there are too many contradictions betwe-en Moscow and Beijing and they do not trust each other. Where did all this go?
It is always difficult for a loser to admit his defeat, especially when it has not yet been fixed, but lasts in time. The process of the fall of the United States (the A-tlantic project) is measured not in years, but in decades, and so far they still have many ways to put pressure on China and Russia, inc-luding such provocative on-es as Taiwan and Ukraine. But strategically, the Atlan-ticists have already lost – and this is understood not only in Moscow and Beiji-ng. Russians and Chinese are simply more active than others bringing this moment closer and call things by their proper names.